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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
;.tithorizing suspension of a license without a hearing have been sustained
nagainst constitutional objection where they give the licensee a right to a trial
de novo on appeal from such suspension. 12 The North Dakota legislature has
provided the licensee with an opportunity for a hearing before the commis-
sioner following suspension, and "upon such hearing the commissioner may
either rescind his order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may
cintinue, modify, or extend the suspension of such license or revoke such
license."'1 Thereafter, the licensee has the right of appeal to the courts to
... examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the peti-
toner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation, or revo-
cation of license . . ."14 The instant case indicates that the hearing before
the court takes the form of a trial de novo of the case. 15
The problem presented by the instant case is one of "separation of powers".
Authority to suspend the license was validly delegated to the Commissioner
and not to the courts." ; The provision for trial de novo in the district court
is not a criminal proceeding in which case the court would have discretion
itn imposing sentence.'T Thus it is arguable that the hearing on appeal should
he concerned with whether the Commissioner's order has been reasonable and
not an abuse of the discretion vested in him by the legislature's For the
court to modify the Commissioner's order as to length of suspension where
slibstantial grounds for suspension exist and there has been no abuse of discre-
tion is in effect to exercise his discretion for him, thereby nullifying the legis-
lative delegation of authority.
CECIL E. REINKE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDER - SUIIARY Dis-
MISSAL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. - Petitioner, an inspector for the Food
and Drug Administration, was summarily dismissed from his employment under
-,uthority of Public Law 7831 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") as extended
Ly Executive Order 10450, April, 1953.2 Petitioner's appeal to the Civil Ser-
vice Commission under authority of the Veteran's Preference Act 3 was de-
clined. Petitioner then filed a complaint in the federal district court and
12. See Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939).
13. N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, § 52.
14. N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, § 38.
15. Cf. In re Wright, 228 N. C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370 (1947). clarified on rehearing
228 N. C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948); Commonwealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 60 A.2d
37 (1948).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. See Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 403, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941) (Suspension or re-
vocation of drivers license is civil and not criminal in nature.)
18. See in re Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1948) (dictum) ("It must
be noted, however, that the discretion to suspend or revoke, or not to suspend or revoke, is
vested in the department, subject te a judicial review of the facts upon which its action
is based. No discretionary power is conferred upon the Superior Court. Hence, if the
judge, upon the hearing, finds and concludes that the license of the petitioner is in fact
subject to suspension or revocatiau under the provisions of the statute, the order of the
department entered in conformity with the facts found must be affirmed.")
1. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U. S. C. §§ 22-1. 22-3 (Supp. 1952).
2. Exec. Order No. 10405, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953) (The Order extends the Act
to all government employees :.nd supplies a negative test which is more stringent than
that prescribed by the Act, i. e., the Order uses "clearly consistent with the interests of
national security" as the test; the Act uses "in the best interest of national security" as
the test. )
3. 58 Stat. 387, 5 U.S.C. 851-69 (1944), as amended; 66 Stat. 626, 5 U.S.C.
§ 851-69 (Cum. Supp. 1956).
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tiereafter appealed from the district court dismissal of his complaint. The
circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
held that the dismissal under Executive Order 10450 was improper since no
determination had been made that petitioner's position affected national
security as required by the Act; and that not all Federal agencies and posi-
tions held thereunder affect national security. Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536,
(1956).
In general, all Civil Service employees are subject to dismissal for such
causes as will promote efficiency within the service.
4 Under these procedures
a reasonable doubt as to loyalty is recognized as grounds for dismissal.- Such
employees are entitled to review by the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty
Review Board. However, Public Law 733 imposes a limitation on this right
of review by authorizing a summary dismissal by the appropriate department
head where the employee's position is affected with the national security,
7
i. e., where he occupies a "sensitive" position;5 and, as extended by Executive
Order 10450,10 where his continued employment is not clearly consistent with
national security."'
Without citing a case, the Supreme Court in the instant case has defined
!-tandards by which the provisions of the Act may be extended to include
positions in agencies and departments not originally included thereunder."
-
Before the President can properly extend the provisions of the Act to other
agencies or departments, these standards appear to require that there be a
reasonable determination that the functions of such instrumentalities are so
affected with the national security as to be sensitive.'
3 Such detennination
requires that the subject organization have access to classified information,'
4
cr that their functions be "closely and immediately concerned with the defense
of the nation". The Court supports its holdings by five separate arguments.
First, the Act was originally applicable to only eleven named agencies which
Lse directly concerned with national defense and which have custody over in-
4. 62 Stat. 354, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1948), as amended; 63 Stat. 1067 (1949), 5
U.S.C. § 652 (Supp. 1952).
5. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22, (D. C. Cir. 1946) Cert. denied, 330 U.
S. 838 (1947).
6. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947), Part II, Par. 3; See Kutcher v.
Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1952) (dictum); See also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d
46 (D. C. Cir. 1950) (that courts will review a dismissal only to insure compliance with
statutory and Constitutional provisions).
7. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (Supp. 1952) (this statute, Pub. Law
733 § 1 (1950), controls wherever in conflict with other acts).
9. Hearings, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on H. R. 7439 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. p. 67, 72 (a sensitive position is one in which the occupant has access
to confidential, classified; or top secret material); See Garrison, Some Observations on 7he
Loyalty Security Program, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1955) (defining sensitive positions
as ". . . positions where the available information would be damaging to the country
if it were revealed to unauthorized persons, or positions in which the policy of the United
States might be warped or molded by a person who did not have the interests of his
county at heart.").
10. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
11. Id § 2.
12. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U. S. C. §§ 22-1, 22-3 (Supp. 1950) (The Act extended to
. the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Depart-
ment of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the
Air Force, Coast Guard, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Resources Board,
. . .National Advisory Commnittee for Aeronautics, . ..' and ". . . to such other depart-
ments and agencieg of the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem
necessary in the best interests of national security.").
13. Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956) (dictum).
14. See note 9 supra.
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fcrmation which affects the national security.' 5  Second, the language used
in the Act in providing for the extension of its provisions "from time to time",
indicates that a selective judgment must be exercised when extending the
Act.'( Third, in providing that a dismissed employee may seek other govern-
Ment employment upon affirmative determination of his eligibility by the Civil
Scrvice Commission, the Act indicates that not all agencies are sensitive. 17
Fourth, legislative history of the Act indicates that it was to apply only to
sensitive agencies.' 8 Fifth, the Act was designed for the protection of national
security;19 and if department heads were not required to determine that a
close proximity exists between an employee's position and national security, the
purpose of the Act could be perverted to allow summary and indiscriminate
dismissal of government employees.20
The dissenting opinion contends that the decision in the instant case strikes
down Executive Order 10450 and questions the Court's power to do so.21 Mr.
Justice Clark, in dissent, also argues that the Court has frustrated the clear
purpose of Congress in that the Act was not meant to apply merely to sensi-
tive agencies.
2 2
It would seem that the Court could have reached its correct result more
directly by resorting to Congressional committee reports which exhibit an in-
tention to protect the nation's security from jeopardy through the acts of care-
k .ss, though not disloyal, employees.2 3 Employees who do not have access to
information closely affecting national security by definition cannot divulge such
material disloyally, carelessly, or at all. 2 4 Since the Act is not directed to the
15. See note 12 supra.
16. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-3 (Supp. 1952).
17. Id § 22-1.
18. S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3279 (1950) ("The purpose of the bill
is to increase the authority of the heads of Government departments engaged in sensitive
activities . . ."); See also Pub. Law 729 § 3 (1942) (not codified) (a previous similar
law was limited to the obviously sensitive military department).
19. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (Supp. 1952).
20. Cohen, Administrative Law, 44 Geo. L. J. 132, 134 (1955) (If the Act were
construed to extend to nonsensitive agencies, unappealable dismissal would be authorized
with no showing that continued employment might endanger national security.)
21. The majority ooinion did not make a pretense of striking down the executive order,
but stated rather that the order as applied by the Secretary was not in conformity with the
Act; and since the President sought to Pct under auhority of the Act, actions taken pur-
suant to the order will not be unbeld unless in conformity with the Act. But see Roth v.
Brownell, 215 F.2d 500, 502 (D. C. Cir. 1954) (as to the possible outcome, had the
court considered the strikedown of the order. "The power of Congress to limit the Presi-
dent's otherwise plenary control over appointments and removals is clear.").
22. S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3279 (1950) (In explanation of the bill,
the report stated "It will be noted that this bill as amended, is not designed to set aside
the. President's loyalty program. It is intended that his program will be continued. Ex-
ecutiye Order 9835 of March 21, 1947, established procedures under which employees
found to be disloyal, as distinct from poor security risks, could be removed from the
Federal Government. This bill is concerned primarily with the problems of dealing with
those Federal employees who, although loyal, are so careless as to jeopardize the national
security."); See letter from Dan A. Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy to Tom Murray,
Chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, March 13, 1950, S. Rep.
No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3281 (1950) ("The provisions of the proposed bill would
not be in conflict with the provisions of Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947
(12 Fed. Reg. 1935). That Executive Order established a Loyalty Review Board within
the Civil Service Commission, which Board is the final arbiter on the dismissal of Federal
employees charged with disloyalty. Executive Order No. 9835 pertains only to removal of
employees who have been proved disloyal. There is no provision contained therein where a
person may be removed who on the one hand is absolutely loyal but on the other hand
is dangerously indiscreet.").
23. 'bid.
24. See Garrison. Some Observations on th" Loualty Security Prnero", 23 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (1955); Weihaus, Federal Loyalty-Security Program, 1956 Wash. U. L. Rev.
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possible disloyalty of federal employees, but to their probable carelessness,25
it can reasonably be extended only to employees who have access to informa-




DOMESTIc RELATIONS - INHERITANCE BY ADOPTED CHILDREN - RIGHT OF
ADOPTED CHILD TO INHERIT FROM ITS NATURAL PARENTS.- Respondent, an
adopted child claimed the right to inherit a one-fourth interest in the estate of
his natural father. The administratrix of the deceased's estate contended that
respondent's right to inherit from his natural parent was cut off by his adoption
into another family. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, affirming the Dis-
t:ict Court, held that the adoption statute did not prevent an adopted child
from inheriting from his natural parent. In re Ballantine's Estate, 81 N.W.2d
259 (N. D. 1957).
Adoption was unknown at common law therefore all provisions for inheri-
tance by adopted children must be found in statutes and the cases construing
them. 1 The North Dakota statutes as quoted in the instant case provide, "The
child so adopted shall be deemed, as respects all legal consequences and inci-
dents of the natural relation of parent and child, the child of such parent or
parents by adoption, the same as if he had been born to them in lawful wed-
lock"2 and "The natural parents of an adopted child shall be deprived by the
decree of adoption of all legal rights respecting the child, and the child shall
be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience respecting his
natural parents."
'
The court in reaching its decision examined the history of the adoption
statute. 4 The statute of 18915 contained the provision that an adopted child
should be treated as one born to the adoptive parents in lawful wedlock
"... except that such adoption shall not itself constitute such child the heir
of such parents or parents by adoption." This quoted provision, the court ob-
served, was omitted in the Revised Code of 1895 and said, "the omission . . .
would not of itself alter . . ." the legislative intent of not disturbing the
child's right to inherit from its natural parents.
The court's construction of the adoption statutes follows the decided
vweight of authority. 6 From a review of cases from jurisdictions with statutes
similar to those in North Dakota, none were found disallowing the adopted
child's right to inherit. Those barring the right base the denial upon specific
statutory provision. The reason for the rule allowing the right of inheritance
353; Emerson & Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 Yale L. J. 1, 3-20
(1948).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. See note 20 supra.
1. See In re Jaren's Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947); Young v.
Bridges, 86 N. H. 135, 165 Atd. 272 (1933); 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 279
(1936).
2. N. D. Rev. Code § 14-1113 (1943).
3. N. D. Rev. Code § 14-1114 (1943).
4. N. D. Sess. Laws 1891, e. 4, § 6.
5. Rev. Codes of N. D. § 2804 (1895).
6. See e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Minn. 740, 199 N.W. 581 (1924); Clarkson v.
Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898); In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d
391 (1953); In re Benner, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946).
